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NOTES AND COMMENT
of the juror's own mind, and, if they purport to state something
different or contrary to the belief or judgment expressed in his
verdict, they will not be considered. The juror by submitting such
an affidavit is impeaching himself. He says that he violated his
sworn duty and word in arriving at and giving forth the verdict
he pronounced. Such is the true meaning of the expression "that
a juror shall not be permitted to impeach his own verdict."
ALBERT OLSEN.

INCOMPATIBILITY Op PARTIs AS GROUND FOR DrvORE--This
brief note is concerned with two recent decisions in the State of
Washington touching the law of divorce, Shaw v. Shaw,1 decided
August 22, 1928, by Department One, and Halter v. Haler,2 decided October 8, 1928, by Department Two.
The facts of both cases turn upon incompatibility or the inability
of the parties to live together. In the Shaw case the court holds that
since the enactment of the Session Laws of 1921, p. 331,3 this is
no longer ground for divorce in this state. In the Haller case the
other department of the court apparently holds that it is a ground
for divorce. The Shaw case points out that the present law of
divorce is predicated upon the element of fault of the delinquent
spouse and that the divorce is granted upon the application of the
"injured" party
Upon principle it is difficult to distinguish between the basic
facts of these two cases. They were both cases of an unfortunate
alliance. In both cases there was no "fault" of either party, sufficient as the court intimates to constitute any one of the statutory
grounds for divorce. In the Shaw case the wife became insane,
which was not a fault. In the Haller case the husband drifted into
the more subdued years, so that, as the court says, the very great
divergence of their ages prevented this man and woman from deriving an appreciable amount of happiness from their marriage, and
for a long period of time they had not lived together as husband
and wife, although occupying the same home. And the court further referred to the "difficulty of attempting to mate 'January'
and 'May,' "and substantially bases its decision upon the following
paragraph of the opinion.

"An examination of the record discloses that it is not
only impossible for these parties to live together as husband and wife, but that it is to their interest and the interest of society that they be divorced."
If the rule stated in the Shaw case is correct, requiring fault of
one or both of the parties in some one or more of the causes stated
1148 Wash. 622, 269 Pac. 804 (1928).
149 Wash. Dec. 153, 270 Pac. 822 (1928).
3 Rem. Comp. Stat., sec. 982.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
in the present statute governing divorces, it would seem that the
reason contained in the above quoted paragraph in the Haller
case would not be valid, unless it be a "fault" in a man to personify
"January" rather than "May " In the Shaw case it was no fault
of the wife that she became insane, and in the Hailer case it was
no fault of the husband that in time he bowed down to the inevitable weight of years. As to the disparity of the ages of this husband
and wife, that was a condition which existed ab snitw. It is difficult also to understand how the interest of society requires that
these parties be divorced.
It appears that in both of these cases that the parties were "unhappy" together and therefore could no longer live together, due
to causes which were not the fault of anybody and over which they
had no control. In one case the court holds this is not ground for
divorce under our present statute, in the other it holds that it is
ground for divorce. The question therefore naturally arises, is
the fact of unhappiness in the marriage relation sufficient ground
for judicially terminating that relation.
Prior to the statute of 1921, the divorce statutes contained this
provision, to-wit
"4
and a divorce may be granted upon application of either party for any cause deemed by the court
suffiicient, and the court shall be satisfied that the parties
can no longer live together "4
The Session Laws of 1921, page 331, amending the divorce statute and in enumerating the grounds for divorce, omitted the above
quoted provision, and now provides that divorce shall be granted on
the application of the party "injured."
It is submitted that this omission indicates the intention of the
Legislature to deprive the courts of discretionary power in divorce
cases, which the above provision apparently gave, and that the
junisdiction of the courts now is to consider and determine divorce
cases upon the statutory grounds only Under our practice causes
in divorce are of purely statutory origin, and the powers of the
courts therein are derived entirely and exclusively from statute.
The courts have no inherent or equitable powers to determine
divorce causes and they have no discretionary powers therein unless
granted by the statute.
It is submitted that under the present statutory law, the decision
in the Shaw case is right, the decision in the Haller case subject to
criticism, in that the court apparently exercised powers with which
it was once vested but which it now no longer possesses.
E. B. Hxa&iAL
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